The Templar's attempt to build a castle at the strategically
significant crossing of the Jordan River known as Jacob's Ford is viewed by some historians as a fatal error contributing materially to the defeat of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Although I personally view that as an overstatement, the role of the Templars in this affair is a useful lens into the historical character of this institution.
On the Upper Jordan River, between
Lake Huleh and the Sea of Galilee, one of the three fords across the Jordan was
located at a place known to the Arabs as Bait al-Ahzan and to the Christians as
Jacob’s Ford. The ford gave access to the fertile valley of Upper Galilee in
the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Here, by the mid-12th century, the Franks
had built or occupied what contemporary Arab chronicler al-Fadil described as “celebrated
cities, encircled by flourishing villages, shady gardens, navigable rivers,
high fortresses, and powerful walls in the enceinte of which their palaces were
built.” (Quoted in: Barber, p. 19.)
Jacob’s Ford was also, according
to Salah ad-Din’s secretary Imad ad-Din, only a day’s ride from Damascus. Saracen
forces could rapidly muster on the eastern shore, and strike across the ford to
raid in the fertile lands of northern Galilee or penetrate deeper into the
Kingdom, threatening the coastal cities of Acre and Tyre. Jacob’s Ford was, in
short, a location of extreme strategic importance to the defense of the Kingdom
of Jerusalem.
Yet for the first three quarters
of the 12th century the ford was not fortified for reasons that
remain obscure to us. Possibly there had been agreements with the Saracens that
neither side would establish castles in the region. At a minimum, according to
the so-called Chronicle of Ernoul, Baldwin IV had agreed not to fortify the
ford. Yet, at the urging of the Knights Templar, King Baldwin reversed his
decision and construction of a castle began at Jacob’s Ford in October 1178.
The Templar role was
significant. Malcolm Barber argues in
his essay “Frontier Warfare in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem” (France, John
and William Zajac. The Crusades and their
Sources, pp.14-15.) that the military orders were at this time trying to
impose a more coherent defensive strategy on a kingdom which up until then had
been defended too haphazardly by local lords. Certainly, it was the Templars
who agreed to man the castle on completion.
Because of the proximity to
Damascus, the construction of the castle itself was extremely dangerous ― another
factor that might have mitigated against its construction in the first place.
In the event, the Franks invested enormous resources to build a powerful castle
in just six months, while (as they well knew) Salah ad-Din was pinned down by
one of his many campaign against his
domestic rivals. The result was that by March 1179 a castle, called Chastellet,
was largely complete. It consisted of a square composed of massive walls with
towers at each corner and a keep on the western wall. Muslim chroniclers claim the walls were more
than five meters (ten cubits/fifteen feet) wide.
What wasn’t finished were the
outer works. These were still under construction by a veritable army of masons
and other workmen such as blacksmiths, carpenters, and laborers, including 100
Muslim slaves. With each day the castle was on its way to becoming more
formidable. Salah ad-Din was suitably alarmed.
The Sultan sent to the King of
Jerusalem and offered to pay him 60,000 dinars if he would dismantle his new
castle. Baldwin IV said no. The Sultan upped his offer to 100,000 dinars,
clearly dreading the cost of reducing the castle by force. Again Baldwin IV
said 'no.' Yet, no sooner had his second offer been rejected than Salah ad-Din began
raiding the surrounding countryside from which the castle obtained supplies.
The garrison of 80 Knights Templar and their squires was inadequate to stop
this raiding. Emboldened, the Sultan ordered an assault on Chastellet ― only to
have his forces beaten back with heavy losses including one of his most
important emirs.
The Sultan turned to raiding
deeper inland, eventually becoming embroiled in the battle on the Litani (Marj
Ayun -- see: True Tales of the Knights Templar 4), but by August 1179 he was back. And this time he brought his siege
equipment. The siege began on August 24,
1179 and the outer compound fell by the evening of that first day. However, the outer compound was not properly
fortified. It did not yet have serious walls and was probably protected only
earthworks and/or wooden defenses. It is unlikely to have been very fiercely defended
under the circumstances. Most of the workers would have fallen back and taken
refuge in the castle proper.
Salah ad-Din did not waste time
with more assaults, however. He immediately set to undermining the castle and
within days he had dug deep enough to believe the walls could be breached. Fire
was set to the wooden props holding up the tunnel. It had no impact on the
castle. Salah ad-Din had to offer a
dinar to anyone willing to risk his life to put out the fire and eventually the
fire was brought under control. The digging continued. Meanwhile, news reached
the Sultan that Baldwin IV was again mustering the army of Jerusalem to come to
the castle’s relief. His sappers were urged to greater effort.
Four days later, at daybreak on
August 29, a large segment of the wall collapsed. The fire used to destroy the tunnel
supports blew into the castle itself, setting fire to the tents and many wooden
structures within the walls. This was the height of a Palestinian summer ― and
the third year of drought. Everything
was dry as a bone. The entire castle was rapidly an inferno. According to a
firsthand account by one of the Saracen assailants, the Templar commander,
realizing all was lost, threw himself into the flames. (Barber, p. 13.)
When the fire finally died out,
the Saracens rushed in. They killed or captured anyone still alive, and seized important
booty, namely weapons, armor and horses. According to the Arab sources, the Christian
corpses were thrown into the well putrefying it ― to their own regret since soon the cadavers spread disease and no less than
ten emirs and hundreds (if not thousands) of common Saracen soldiers (Barber, p. 15). Of the 700 Christians who had been at Chastellet when
the siege began some slaughtered immediately, but “the greater part were
massacred en route by the volunteer troops.” (Barber. P. 13). The survivors ended in the slave markets of
Damascus.
Given the Templar ethos of
preferring martyrdom to surrender, it is highly unlikely that any of those
survivors were Templars.
Principle Sources:
The Knights Templar were at the height of their popularity in the late 12th century and appear in my novels set in this period.
Principle Sources:
- Barber, Malcolm. “Frontier Warfare in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.” The Crusades and their Sources, edited by John France and William G. Zajac, Ashgate, 1998.
- Howarth, Stephen. The Knights Templar. Barnes and Noble, 1982.
- Smail, R.C.. Crusading Warfare 1097-1193. Barnes and Noble, 1956.
"The Tale of the English Templar" is a fictional work that depicts the destruction of the Knight's Templar.
An escaped Templar, an old knight, and a discarded bride embark on a quest for justice in the face of tyranny.
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A crusader in search of faith --
A lame lady in search of revenge --
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St. Louis' Knight takes you to the Holy Land in the 13th century, and a world filled with knights, nobles, prophets -- and assassins.
A lame lady in search of revenge --
And a King who would be saint.
St. Louis' Knight takes you to the Holy Land in the 13th century, and a world filled with knights, nobles, prophets -- and assassins.
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