Were the crusader states doomed from the start? Were they inherently nonviable? Most commentators point to the Battles of Hattin and/or La Forbie as the "beginning of the end." Yet the Kingdom of Jerusalem was almost fully restored to its pre-Hattin borders in 1243, and in retrospect even La Forbie was only an apparent and not a substantive turning point. In fact, their doom was not inevitable.

The battle
of La Forbie was not a clash between Christians and Muslims, but rather between
Ayyubid princes, in which the Franks had the misfortune to back the losing
side. Notably, the defeat did not result in the Kingdom of Jerusalem being
over-run and destroyed — precisely because the victor was not engaged in jihad.
Thus, decisive as this battle appears, it was not the cause of
subsequent decline. As long as the Ayyubid princes remained in control of the
territories surrounding the crusader states, it was possible to 1) make truces
with them, and 2) play them off against one another. The Ayyubids were far too
interested in profiting from the trade they had with the crusader states to
undertake serious jihad. It was not until the rise of the Mamluks that the
crusaders faced opponents set on their destruction and eradication.
The Mamluks were not a dynasty, but a cadre of
fanatical, orthodox, military leaders willing to sacrifice economic
considerations for religious orthodoxy and victory. The Mamluks pursued a
ruthless policy of aggression against the crusader states that included
routinely breaking truces, breaking the terms of truces, slaughtering
prisoners, and engaging in the wanton destruction of economic assets and
cultural monuments to render the cities they captured uninhabitable for
generations to come. The Mamluks did not pursue wars of conquest in which they
hoped to occupy and benefit from the territory they conquered but rather wars
of annihilation.
Yet the Mamluks alone are not responsible for
the destruction of the crusader states. The rot came from the inside. From 1100
to 1225, Jerusalem was ruled by kings resident in the kingdom, who viewed the
defense of the Holy Land as their raison d’etre. From Baldwin I to John de
Brienne, these kings had been fighting men devoted to the kingdom they
inherited, whether by blood or marriage.
In 1225, that changed. The marriage of the
heiress of Jerusalem, Yolanda, to the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II
Hohenstaufen, put the crown — and fate — of Jerusalem into the hands of a man
who already possessed a vast Empire. As events were to prove, Frederick II
never gave more than a tinker’s damn about Jerusalem or the Kingdom named after
it. He spent less than a year in the kingdom, he ignored its constitution,
sought to humiliate and break the local barons, and on his death bed in 1250
tried to alienate it from the legitimate heir. His son and grandson were titular
“Kings of Jerusalem,” who never set foot in the kingdom, had no understanding
of its laws, people or problems, and exercised no influence there. Their worthless
rule was followed by a succession crisis that was not solved until 1284, when
the kingdom was already beyond salvage.
In short, between 1225 and 1284, the Kingdom
of Jerusalem effectively had no central authority. It is hardly surprising that
in the circumstances internal factions formed, and that clashes over policy led
to bloodshed. Without central authority, the barons soon resorted to pursuing independent
policies that further eroded the state, while the Italian city-states pursued
their commercial rivalries without the least regard for the impact on the
viability of the Latin East.
None of this was inevitable. The crusader
states, backed with the resources of Cyprus, might well have held their own
against the Mamluks and Mongols, if they had been led by a strong, determined
and militarily capable king. This was effectively what the barons of Jerusalem
had sought in 1190, when they rejected the leadership of the ineffectual Guy de
Lusignan and chose Conrad de Montferrat as the king-consort of their queen. In
the thirteenth century, they would have needed to reject the ‘legitimate’ Hohenstaufen
kings in favor a truly elected king committed to the defence of the Holy Land —
say Simon de Montfort. However, the barons of Outremer, despite their
‘rebellion,’ were ultimately too conservative to take the leap necessary for
the sake of their existence. Yet that assessment, obviously, is the wisdom of
hindsight.
The bulk of this entry is an excerpt from Dr. Schrader's comprehensive study of the crusader states.
Dr.
Helena P. Schrader is also the author of six books set in the Holy Land
in the Era of the Crusades.
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