Continuing with the series on the Knights Templar intended to counter
the misinformation and sensationalism of the "Knightfall" Dr.
Schrader today looks at the important role played by the Knights Templar in the
Battle of Montgisard.
A modern portrayal of the Battle of Montgisard by Mariusz Kozik
In
in 1177,
Salah-ad-Din (known in the West as Saladin) launched the first of what were to be several full-scale
invasions
of the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem. At this time Saladin had effectively united the Caliphates of Cairo and
Baghdad for the first time in 200 years, but his hold on power was
still precarious.
In Egypt his faced suspicion and opposition because he was Sunni, and in
Syria
he was viewed as a usurper and upstart because he was a Kurd and had
stolen the
Sultanate from the rightful heir.
A Contemporary Depiction of Salah-ad-Din from an Islamic Manuscript
Saladin
countered these internal doubts and dissatisfaction with the
age-old device of focusing attention on an external enemy: the Christian states
established by the crusaders along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean.
These states represented a clear and serious military threat to his lines of
communication between Egypt and Syria. But Saladin
did not simply beat the drum of alarm concerning an external enemy in order to
rally his subjects around him; he also took up the cry of “jihad” — Holy War. This was a obvious attempt to increase his stature
vis-a-vis his remaining rivals in Syria. Salah-ad-Din means “righteousness of
the faith,” and throughout his career Salah-ad-Din used campaigns against the
Christian states as a means of rallying support.
Another depiction of Saladin; Source Unknown
Meanwhile,
in
the Kingdom of Jerusalem, King Amalaric, who had been led five expeditions into Egypt, had died. He
had been succeeded by Baldwin IV, a youth suffering from leprosy.
Conscious of his own weakness and immanent death, Baldwin IV sent to the
West for
aid, and in early August 1177, Count Philip of Flanders reached Acre
with a
large force of Western knights.
On the advice
of the High Court, Baldwin IV offered Philip of Flanders the regency of his
kingdom, whose armies were preparing yet another invasion of Egypt aided by a
large Byzantine fleet. Flanders, however, insisted on being made king of any
territories the joint Christian forces conquered. The idea did not sit well
with either the King of Jerusalem or the Emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire,
both of whom were footing the bill and providing the bulk of the troops for the
expedition. The result was that the entire expedition was called off, the
Byzantine fleet withdrew and Philip of Flanders took his knights and half the
barons of Jerusalem north to attack the Seljuk strongholds of Hama and Harim
instead.
A Medieval depiction of a Crusading Host |
Salah ad-Din had gathered his
forces in Egypt to repel the impending attack. He rapidly learned that not only
had the invasion of Egypt been called off, the Byzantine fleet had withdrawn and
the bulk of the fighting forces of Jerusalem had moved north. It was a splendid
opportunity to strike, and the Sultan seized the opportunity, invading with a
force estimated at 26,000 light horse — which leaves open the question of
whether there were infantry with him or not. The force also allegedly included
some 1,000 mameluks of the Sultan’s personal body guard.
Salah
ad-Din's army crossed into Frankish territory from Egypt and significantly
by-passed the Templar stronghold at Gaza. Presumably, Salah ad-Din considered
it too tough a nut to crack. Laying siege to a Templar fortress would, he
calculated, cost far too much time and too many lives. Salah ad-Din (as
throughout his career) preferred "soft targets.
Significantly,
the Templars let the Saracen army pass without offering any resistance. The
Templars were said to have gathered a large fighting force at Gaza, thinking
this would be the target of the invasion. (Howarth, p. 132; Robinson, p. 131.)
Furthermore, the Master of the Temple had taken personal command at Gaza in
anticipation of this confrontation. The new Master was Odo de Saint
Amand. He was a man William of Tyre (who knew him personally) described as
"dictated by the spirit of pride, of which he had an excess."
(Barber, p. 109.) Two years later, Saint Amand would be responsible for a Templar
charge that very nearly cost the Kingdom of Jerusalem their king, and landed
him in a Saracen prison. So it is unlikely that the Templars failed to respond
to Salah ad-Din's invasion out of indifference or fear. Furthermore, as my
essay on the Siege of Ascalon highlighted, the Templars were capable of
impetuous acts in which they took on forces much larger than their own. The
most likely explanation is that despite an ethos that viewed numbers as
irrelevant in the face of faith, the size of the invading army was simply too
daunting for the roughly 300 knights collected at Gaza.
Meanwhile, according to
an anonymous Christian chronicler from northern Syria, the news of Saladin’s
invasion plunged Jerusalem into despair. The king was just 16 years old, had no
battle experience of his own. His most experienced commanders (or many of
them) were besieging Hama. The Constable of the Kingdom, the competent and wise
Humphrey de Toron II, was gravely ill. Nevertheless, Baldwin rallied his forces and with just 376 knights made a dash
to Ascalon, the southern-most stronghold of his kingdom.
Baldwin and his improvised force of secular knights arrived in Ascalon only shortly before Salah ad-Din with his whole army on November 22. King Baldwin took control
of the city, but then hesitated to risk open battle with the Saracens because of the imbalance of
forces. Thus, while King Baldwin's dash to Ascalon had
been heroic, it had been rash as well. Salah ad-Din was now in a position to keep the King and his knights bottled up inside
Ascalon with only a fraction of his forces, while taking the rest of his army and striking at the now unprotected Jerusalem
This was exactly what Salah ad-Din did, and it might have resulted in the fall of Jerusalem had Salah ad-Din not made a major error. The Sultan and
his emirs were so confident of victory that they took time to plunder the rich
cities of the coastal plain, notably Ramla and Lydda, but also as far inland
as Hebron. In Jerusalem, the terrified population sought refuge in the Citadel
of David.
The Citadel of David as it appears today. |
But Baldwin IV
was not yet defeated. With the number of Saracen troops surrounding Ascalon dramatically
reduced, he risked a sortie. H also somehow managed to get word to the Templars at Gaza of his plans and request that they rendezvous with him.
The Templars were not vassals of the King of Jerusalem and not obliged to do as he asked. But Saint Amand did not hesitate to join the King. He sortied out of Gaza with his entire mobile force of just 84 knights, plus an unknown number of sergeants and Turcopoles.
Together this mounted force started to shadow Saladin’s now dispersed and no longer disciplined army. Frankish tactics, however, required a combination of cavalry and infantry, so King Baldwin could not engage the enemy until he had sufficient infantry as well. He issued the arrière ban, a general call to arms that obligated every Christian to rally to the royal standard in defense of the realm. Infantry started streaming to join him.
The Templars were not vassals of the King of Jerusalem and not obliged to do as he asked. But Saint Amand did not hesitate to join the King. He sortied out of Gaza with his entire mobile force of just 84 knights, plus an unknown number of sergeants and Turcopoles.
Together this mounted force started to shadow Saladin’s now dispersed and no longer disciplined army. Frankish tactics, however, required a combination of cavalry and infantry, so King Baldwin could not engage the enemy until he had sufficient infantry as well. He issued the arrière ban, a general call to arms that obligated every Christian to rally to the royal standard in defense of the realm. Infantry started streaming to join him.
On the afternoon
of November 25, King Baldwin’s host of about 450 knights (375 secular knights
and 84 Templars from Gaza), with their squires, Turcopoles and infantry in
unspecified numbers caught up with the main body of Saladin’s troops at a place
near Montgisard or Tell Jazar, near Ibelin (modern day Yavne).
The Sultan, as he later admitted to Saracen chroniclers, was caught off-guard. Before he could properly deploy his troops, the main force of Christian knights, probably led by Templars, smashed into Saladin’s still disorganized troops, apparently while some were still crossing or watering their horses in a stream.
The Sultan, as he later admitted to Saracen chroniclers, was caught off-guard. Before he could properly deploy his troops, the main force of Christian knights, probably led by Templars, smashed into Saladin’s still disorganized troops, apparently while some were still crossing or watering their horses in a stream.
Modern Depiction of Montgisard by Zvonimir (copyright Medieval World) with the the Templars and the Ibelins at the forefront of the Frankish cavalry. |
Although the
battle was hard fought and there were heavy Christian casualties, the Sultan’s forces
were soon routed. Not only that, Salah ad-Din himself came very close to being killed or captured and allegedly escaped on
the back of a pack-camel.
For the bulk of his army there was no escape. Those who were not slaughtered immediately on the field, found themselves scattered and virtually defenseless in enemy territory. Although they abandoned their plunder, it was still a long way home — and the rains had set in. Cold, wet, slowed down by the mud, no longer benefiting from the strength of numbers, they were easy prey for the residents and settlers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The latter, after the sack of Lydda, Ramla and other lesser places, had good reason to crave revenge. Furthermore, even after escaping Christian territory, the Sultan’s troops still found no refuge because once in the desert the Bedouins took advantage of the situation to enslave as many men as they could catch in order to enrich themselves. Very few men of the Sultan’s army made it home to safety in Egypt.
For the bulk of his army there was no escape. Those who were not slaughtered immediately on the field, found themselves scattered and virtually defenseless in enemy territory. Although they abandoned their plunder, it was still a long way home — and the rains had set in. Cold, wet, slowed down by the mud, no longer benefiting from the strength of numbers, they were easy prey for the residents and settlers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The latter, after the sack of Lydda, Ramla and other lesser places, had good reason to crave revenge. Furthermore, even after escaping Christian territory, the Sultan’s troops still found no refuge because once in the desert the Bedouins took advantage of the situation to enslave as many men as they could catch in order to enrich themselves. Very few men of the Sultan’s army made it home to safety in Egypt.
Saladin was
badly shaken by this defeat. He had good reason to believe it would discredit
him and initially feared it would trigger revolts against his rule. Later, he
convinced himself that God had spared him for a purpose. Certainly he was to learn
from his defeat. He never again allowed himself to be duped by his own
over-confidence and his subsequent campaigns against the crusader states were
marked by greater caution. It was not until the crushing defeat of
the Frankish armies at Hattin in July 1187 — almost ten years later — that he
had his revenge not just on the Frankish kingdom but specifically on the Knights Templar as well.
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Dr. Helena P. Schrader holds a PhD in History.
She is the Chief Editor of the Real Crusades History Blog.
She is an award-winning novelist and author of numerous books both
fiction and non-fiction. Her three-part biography of Balian d'Ibelin won a
total of 14 literary accolades. Her most recent release is a novel about the
founding of the crusader Kingdom of Cyprus. You can find out more at: http://crusaderkingdoms.com