As
almost every student of the crusades knows, it was the Byzantine
Emperor Alexios I Comnenus who ignited the crusading movement by sending
an appeal for aid to Pope Urban II. Yet the response of the West did not resemble what the Emperor had envisaged and the First Crusade triggered a new period of tension between the Latin West and the Orthodox East largely based on fundamental misunderstandings. Below is a short summary.
Alexios' request that reached the West
in 1095 was a response to increased pressure on the Eastern Roman
Empire’s eastern frontiers. The
Seljuk Turks had converted to Islam and with the passion of the newly
converted and the skills of nomadic warriors had set about establishing
their domination over Syria. This conquest complete, they turned on
Armenia, Cilicia, and the Levant, driving the Byzantines out, before
striking at Anatolia. In 1071, the Byzantine Emperor Romanus IV Diogenes
had assembled the military forces of his empire and marched to the
defense of this vital heartland -- only to be decisively defeated on
August 26 at the Battle of Manzikert.
In
the quarter-century that followed, the idea that Western (barbarian)
Christians might be able to assist the Empire in its struggle with the
Turks had gained popularity. After all, the Byzantine Emperors were
familiar with the fighting qualities of many of the Western “barbarians”
because they employed Norse, Norman, English and Frankish mercenaries
in the Varangian Guard, the personal body-guard of the
Emperors. The Byzantines had also had the less than pleasant experience
of clashing with the Normans over control of Southern Italy and Sicily.
While these encounters increased Byzantine contempt for the Normans as
barbarians, it also convinced them of the value of the Normans as
fighters.
What
the Byzantine Emperor had in mind when he requested aid from the West
was the recruitment of several hundred trained knights to serve as
mercenaries in the Byzantine army. The Emperor planned and expected to
place these trained fighting men strictly under the control and command
of Byzantine authorities. What he got, as everyone knows, was tens of
thousands of undisciplined, amorphous “armed pilgrims” (an oxymoron in
Byzantine tradition). The Byzantine government and administration were
overwhelmed, baffled and ultimately frightened of the monster they had
created.
Byzantine
sources reveal a sense of horror at the sheer numbers of “crusaders”
that suddenly descended upon them. Sources described them as “a crowd as
innumerable as grains of sand and the stars” or “like rivers which,
flowing from all directions…came against our [lands]” and “beyond
count.” The daughter of the ruling Emperor, Anna Comnena, writing
decades after the First Crusade (that she had personally witnessed)
claimed that “the whole of the West and all the barbarian races who had
inhabited the land beyond the Adriatic” descended on her homeland. [Anna
Commena, trans. Aphrodite Papayianni, 283-284.]
Yet nearly as terrifying as their numbers was the character of
these “pilgrims.” Particularly shocking was the presence of women and
children among the “pilgrims.” Because the Byzantines had requested
military support, they expected trained soldiers. Because they did not
have a secular tradition of pilgrimage, they did not understand why
women or children would want to undertake a long and perilous journey.
Because they did not see Jerusalem as central to Christianity (now that
it had been replaced by the New Jerusalem, Constantinople), they could
not fathom the emotional appeal of Jerusalem for Latin Christians.
Added
to the bewilderment about the nature of the crusaders themselves was
confusion -- and ultimately disgust -- at the lack of unified command.
The Byzantine Empire was still a highly centralized and hierarchical
state. All power derived from the Emperor, even the church was no
competitor and challenger to secular authorities as in the West.
Byzantine armies had traditions reaching back to the legions of ancient
Rome. Although in this period the army had been newly reorganized under
Alexios I, the basis of this army remained proud, professional, and
disciplined units. The Byzantines retained from the Roman past clear
command structures, ranks, and regiments — units of a specified size
(e.g. 10, 50, 100, 300, 500).The First Crusade, in contrast, had no overall
commander. There were no organized units. Even those bodies of men
associated with one another through kinship and vassalage could be any
size from a handful to scores and all remained volunteers on pilgrimage
for the benefit of their individual soul, not soldiers under orders.
It
is hardly surprising that when confronted with this flood of
undisciplined, disorganized armed pilgrims engaged in an
incomprehensible undertaking that the Byzantines became unnerved. The
irrational always triggers suspicion in humans, and so, unable to
believe that these disorganized and undisciplined barbarian hordes could
really hope to regain Jerusalem, the Byzantines concluded that the real intention of these masses descending on them was the capture of Constantinople itself!
Thus,
Anna Comnena wrote in her history: “to all appearances, they were on
pilgrimage to Jerusalem; in reality, they planned to dethrone Alexius
and seize the capital.” [Wright, 61] A Byzantine historian writing about
the Second Crusade (1147-1159) likewise claimed: “…the whole western
array had been set in motion on the handy excuse that they were going to
cross from Europe to Asia and fight the Turks en route and … seek the
holy places, but truly to gain possession of the Romans’ land by assault
and trample down everything in front of them.” [Wright, 62]
The
fact that the crusaders failed to take Constantinople and, in fact, did
continue on to the Holy Land where they captured Jerusalem, established
independent states and continued to fight the Saracens for the next two
hundred years was attributed (conveniently) to the brilliance of
Byzantine policy. The Byzantine court patted itself on the back for
deflecting the crusaders from their evil intents and successfully
diverting their energies to the conquest of Muslim-held territory.
Indeed,
the actual conquest of Jerusalem not only failed to assuage suspicions
but rather created new problems. On the one hand, the Byzantine Emperors
claimed all the lands conquered by the crusaders as their own since it
had once been part of the Eastern Roman Empire. Furthermore,
the Byzantine Emperors as (in their eyes) the Head of the Christian
Church claimed to be the protectors of the Holy Sepulcher. As the
crusaders were understandably unwilling to recognize the claims of the
Byzantine emperors to their conquests (won with hard fighting, blood,
and casualties) and equally unwilling to recognize the primacy of the
Orthodox Church over their own, the Byzantine suspicions of the western
“barbarians” only increased.
The
tragedy was that Byzantine suspicions of the crusaders turned into a
self-fulling prophesy. In the first century of crusading, Byzantine
emperors so frequently hampered or harassed crusaders that sentiment in
the West turned increasingly hostile to the “Greeks” (as the Latin
Christians called the Byzantines). The history of tension and broken
promises as seen from the crusaders’ perspective made the assault
against Constantinople possible.
The Holy Land in the Era of the Crusades: Kingdoms at the Crossroads of Civilizations is available for pre-order on amazon.com and amazon.co.uk.
Dr. Helena P. Schrader is also the author of six books set in the Holy Land in the Era of the Crusades: