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Showing posts with label John d'Ibelin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John d'Ibelin. Show all posts

Saturday, November 22, 2025

Civil War in the Crusader States

 

 Although Frederick II Hohenstaufen spent only a few months in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, his impact on the kingdom was arguably fatal. With the wisdom of hindsight, we can see that the civil war that he ignited and the policy of absentee monarchy that his dynasty adopted doomed the kingdom more certainly than the actions of Saladin or the Mamluks.

The opening volley in this war occurred incongruously at a banquet shortly after Frederick’s arrival in Cyprus on his way to Acre for the Sixth Crusade. Here the emperor's armed men surrounded the unarmed guests and then Frederick proceeded to demand that one of the leading noblemen of he land, the Lord of Beirut, surrender his lordship — without stating a reason much less proving any wrong-doing. 
 
Despite the obvious threat of violence, Beirut responded by saying he held Beirut by right and would not surrender it without a judgement of the High Court. He then walked out of the banquet with the bulk of the Cypriot knights and barons at his back. The bulk of the nobility sided with Beirut because he demanded no more than what his contemporaries viewed as right and just: the right to a trial before his peers. The Emperors response was to threaten violence, to demand hostages, and to allow these to be mishandled while in his custody.
 
A temporary compromise was worked out in which the Emperor agreed to release the hostages and bring the charges against Beirut in the respective High Courts in exchange for Beirut surrendering the castles of Cyprus to the Emperor’s men and joining his crusade. While Beirut, his adult sons, nephews, and vassals were in Syria, however, the Emperor sent the Count of Cotron to Cyprus to lay waste the lands of Beirut, his family and supporters. Furthermore, Frederick attempted to arbitrarily bestow the lordship and castle of Toron on his clients the Teutonic Knights, ignoring the claims of the hereditary heirs thereby alienating another powerful family in Outremer. He likewise attempted to seize control of the Templar castle of Athlit by force. By all these actions, Frederick demonstrated that he had no interest in the laws or constitution of the kingdom. It was clear to all that he respected no one’s rights but his own, and that he was willing to use force against his own subjects to get his way. 
 
When Frederick departed the Holy Land via Cyprus, he sold the regency for the still under-aged King Henry of Cyprus to five Cypriot noblemen. They were ordered to ensure Beirut and his supporters never again set foot in the island kingdom. This demonstrated that all his signed promises to bring his charges against Beirut before the High Court were worthless. He then sailed away never to return.
 
The ‘five baillies’ of Cyprus (as they have gone down in history) began a rapacious regime that undermined their popularity. In consequence, when Beirut returned with a small force, he was able to land at Gastria and advance to the outskirts of Nicosia. The five baillies called up the feudal army of Cyprus and met Beirut’s army at the Battle of Nicosia on 14 July 1229. Although the victory went to the Ibelins, all five baillies escaped to the mountain castles. Beirut was forced to besiege both Kantara and St. Hilarion.  Not until shortly after Easter 1230 did the baillies surrender St. Hilarion in exchange for a full amnesty.
 
Frederick II, however, had not achieved his objectives. So, in the autumn of 1231 he sent the Imperial Marshal Richard Filangieri with a fleet of thirty-three ships loaded with mercenaries to enforce his rule in the kingdoms of both Cyprus and Jerusalem. In the former, Fredrick issued orders to King Henry in his capacity as the “Overlord of Cyprus.” In Jerusalem, Frederick named Filangieri his “baillie” or deputy.
 
Filangieri anchored first off Cyprus and sent the Bishop of Melfi ashore as Frederick’s envoy. In Frederick’s name, the bishop ineptly demanded that King Henry of Cyprus expel the Lord of Beirut and all his relatives from his realm. Henry blandly pointed out that he could not comply with the Emperor’s orders because he was himself a relative of Beirut. He further noted that it was a lord’s duty to defend his vassals — not hound them out of their fiefs without cause or trial.
 
Since Beirut had rushed to Cyprus with all the men and his sons held the ports, the Emperor’s marshal made the wise decision not to attempt a landing in Cyprus against resistance. Instead, he sailed by night and struck the undefended city of Beirut. The town surrendered without a fight, but the citadel with only a skeleton garrison held firm for their lord. Leaving the bulk of his forces investing the citadel, Filangieri continued to Acre where he presented his credentials as Frederick’s baillie and was recognized as such by the High Court of Jerusalem. However, the Court objected to his seizure of the city of Beirut on the grounds there had been no judgement by the Court against the Lord of Beirut. Filangieri, who had just sworn to uphold the laws and customs of the kingdom, answered that he needed to ‘take counsel’ with his magnates. He withdrew from Acre, set up his residence in Tyre, and joined his troops to pursue the siege of Beirut citadel with increased vigor. In short, Filangieri had no more interest in the laws and customs of the Kingdom than did his master Frederick II. The Lord of Beirut had been disseized by force without a judgement of the High Court.
 
Beirut, however, refused to concede defeat. Instead, he made a dramatic appeal to King Henry of Cyprus for aid, and the king responded by personally calling up the feudal army of Cyprus. After a dangerous winter crossing, this army landed on the Syrian coast. Here the former Imperial baillies and some eighty knights (roughly 20% of the Cypriot feudal elite) defected from King Henry’s host and rode for Tripoli. The remaining troops under the Lord of Beirut and King Henry advanced down the coast to challenge the Imperial army besieging Beirut. When it became clear that the Cypriot army was insufficiently strong to lift the siege, Beirut smuggled roughly one hundred fighting men through the sea blockade into the citadel, and then withdrew with the rest of the army to Acre in search of additional backing.
 
Beirut put his case before the High Court. This brought him the direct support of some forty knights, while the High Court sent a high-ranking delegation to Filangieri to remind him of the laws and advise him to end his siege. Filangieri’s referred them back to Emperor Friedrich. His blunt dismissal of the concerns of the representatives of the High Court won over the minority of nobles who until then had  remained loyal to the Emperor
 
In addition, Beirut won the support of the Genoese — who were dogged opponents of the Hohenstaufens in Italy already. In addition, the ‘Commune of Acre’ had been created. This was an ad hoc body with no legal basis or function, which served as a rallying point for opponents of Imperial power from all classes, ethnic groups and religions. The ‘Commune’ elected the Lord of Beirut their ‘mayor.’ 
 
With these forces Beirut felt strong enough to risk an attack on Filangieri’s base in Tyre. The threat to Tyre, forced Filangieri to lift the siege of Beirut Citadel, and offer to negotiate. While the Lord of Beirut was negotiating with Filangieri’s envoys in Acre, however, Filangieri’s army overran the Cypriot/Ibelin camp at Casal Imbert capturing ships, horses, tents, equipment and twenty-four knights. King Henry barely escaped in his nightshirt, riding all the way to Acre to bring word of the debacle.
 
In assessments of this incident, too much attention has been paid to the fact that the Cypriots/Ibelins were caught completely off guard, and too little attention to how the defeat significantly increased popular support for the Lord of Beirut. Filangieri’s surprise strike during a truce was considered treacherous. Like the banquet for unarmed guests in which Frederick hid soldiers and like the Count of Cotron’s attack in Cyprus while Beirut was loyally serving under Frederick in Syria, this attack struck contemporaries as deceitful and dishonorable.  
 
Meanwhile, thinking the Lord of Beirut and the King of Cyprus were effectively knocked out of action by their humiliation at Casal Imbert, Filangieri took his fleet and army to overrun Cyprus. King Henry and Beirut pursued them -- in imperial ships that they expropriated in Acre! They dramatically wrecked this ships on an coastal island, crossed over a ford only passable at low tide, and took Famagusta from the rear without a fight as the Imperial forces fled in the night. Henry was able to re-occupy his capital without bloodshed. 
 
However, Filiangieri still commanded a much larger army of Imperial mercenaries. Furthermore, the king’s sisters were trapped in the castle of St. Hilarion, which was besieged by Imperial forces, and supplies were running dangerously low. This latter fact forced King Henry and Beirut to attempt the relief of St. Hilarion, thereby risking a confrontation with the Imperial forces drawn up on the flank of the mountain ridge separating the Cypriot army from St. Hilarion. 
 
At the sight of the Cypriot/Ibelin army, the Imperial knights charged down the hill confident of overwhelming it. In the ensuing Battle of Agridi fought on 15 June 1232, the Cypriot/Ibelin force decisively defeated Filangieri’s men. The battle is remembered for the role played by the infantry, largely composed of local troops who came out in support of their king. These reportedly killed unhorsed Imperial knights, while helping Cypriot/Ibelin knights back into the saddle. Imperial casualties were huge by the standards of the day, namely sixty knights. Nevertheless, Filangieri was able to withdraw with the bulk of his troops to the coastal castle of Kyrenia.
 
From here Filangieri appealed to Antioch, Armenia, and the Emperor for help; he received none. He and those Cypriots who had sided with the him sailed away to safety, while a garrison held Kyrenia for almost a year before surrendering to royal Cypriot forces. Frederick II never again tried to interfere in Cypriot affairs, and in 1246 the pope solemnized the de facto situation by formally absolving King Henry of all oaths of vassalage to the Holy Roman Emperor. Thereafter, the Kingdom of Cyprus was fully independent.
 
Frederick’s claim to be King of Jerusalem and to rule without the consent of the High Court, however, had not been resolved — and nor had his determination to humiliate the Lord of Beirut. The latter, however, continued to enjoy the solid backing of the bulk of the politically active elements in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, including the Knights Templar, the Genoese and the Commune of Acre. On the other hand, the Teutonic Knights were staunchly Imperial in their loyalties, and the Hospitallers tended to the Imperial side. In addition, a significant minority of knights and burgesses, concentrated in Tyre, remained loyal to the Holy Roman Emperor. Thus, the kingdom was effectively split into two entities.
 
Recognizing that the use of force had failed in the short-term, Frederick II put forward a ‘compromise’ proposal which entailed a general amnesty for everyone who had (in his opinion) committed treason — except the Ibelins. He also recognized the de-facto division of the kingdom into two halves, proposing that henceforth the north of the kingdom would be ruled from Tyre by his baillie Filangieri, while the south of the kingdom with the intransigent Acre would be ruled by a new baillie who he who personally appoint without the approval of the High Court. The proposal shows just how little the Emperor understood the rebellion. The problem was not one of personnel but principle. The Rebels challenged his right to appoint any baillie without the consent of the High Court and objected to his attempts to disseize one of their number without a judgement of the High Court.
 
In April 1234 the pope became involved in seeking a settlement between the Emperor and his rebellious subjects in the Holy Land. The terms he proposed amounted to unconditional surrender by the rebels, recognition of the Emperor’s right to appoint whoever he liked, dissolution of the Commune of Acre, and no pardons for the Ibelins. The rebels shrugged and ignored the offer, bringing down papal wrath, which included not only excommunication for the Lord of Beirut and his supporters but interdict on the city Acre. By October, the pope was frantically rescinding the interdict because so many Franks were simply turning to the Orthodox churches. At last recognizing that one cannot negotiate an agreement by listening only to one side, the pope asked the rebels to send representatives to Rome to discuss terms.
 
The men sent to Rome appear to have been intimidated and bullied into accepting disadvantageous terms because on their return they were nearly lynched. New envoys were sent back to the pope, arriving in April 1236. By now, despite the death of the Lord of Beirut (who was still in full possession of his fiefs and wealthy enough dispense largess with both hands on his deathbed), the pope’s relationship with Frederick II was deteriorating again. Pope Gregory IX suddenly discovered that the rebels might have some valid points after all. Thereafter, he made no further attempt to intervene, and the stalemate continued.
 
In April 1243, the infant boy whose birth had killed Queen Yolanda turned fifteen. In accordance with the laws of Jerusalem, Frederick II’s regency ended. Yet Frederick continued to call himself ‘King of Jerusalem,’ thereby usurping the rights of his own son. Nevertheless, Frederick knew enough about the laws to send instructions to Acre and Tyre in Conrad’s name. The barons weren’t fooled. They became even more inventive in finding transparently self-serving legal arguments for non-compliance. The most important of these was a fictitious claim that when a monarch came of age while absent from the kingdom, his/her closest relative resident in the country held the regency until the monarch appeared in person to take the homage of vassals. By this ploy, Conrad’s great-aunt Alice, the dowager queen of Cyprus, became regent. She demanded the surrender of Tyre to her, and when (as expected) Filangieri refused, Balian of Beirut (John d’Ibelin’s eldest son and heir) seized it by force. Filangieri returned to Sicily where Frederick imprisoned him for his years of loyal service and sent in his stead Thomas of Accera. The later did not dare set foot in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and spent his entire tenure in Antioch instead.  
 
A colorful contemporary account of the conflict written by Philip de Novare, an opponent of the Emperor, has disproportionately influenced modern understanding of the conflict, reducing it to nothing more than a personal struggle between Frederick II and the Lord of Beirut. This is unfortunate. While Beirut was a highly respected nobleman, he did not enjoy the support of roughly four-fifths of the Cypriot nobility, more than half of the Syrian nobility, the Templars, the Genoese and the Commune of Acre because he was such a nice fellow. Rather, the Emperor’s arrogant, arbitrary and unconstitutional attempt to disseize Beirut met with widespread outrage and finally armed opposition because it was recognised as a dangerous precedent. The lords of Cyprus and Jerusalem recognized that if the Emperor got away with disseizing a lord as powerful and well-connected as Beirut, than no one else would be safe from arbitrary Imperial actions.
 
Stripped of personalities and rhetoric, the underlying issue in this conflict between Emperor Frederick and the rebel barons were incompatible views about the nature of monarchy in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Frederick II was a proponent of absolutism, who viewed himself as Emperor and King by the Grace of God. He recognized no fetters on his rights to rule ― neither laws nor constitutions, not institutions nor counsels, nor indeed his own promises, as he reserved to himself the right to change his mind about anything. The Kingdom of Jerusalem, on the other hand, was a feudal state par excellence. Furthermore, by this point in time, the nobility of the Kingdom of Jerusalem had already evolved sophisticated constitutional views and legal procedures.
 
First and foremost, the nobility of Outremer held to the fundamental feudal concept that government was a contract between the king and his subjects, a reciprocal agreement entailing obligations on both sides. Yet Frederick consistently flaunted the laws and customs of the kingdom and especially the High Court.  The baronial faction countered by becoming ever more inventive in discovering ‘laws’ and customs that undermined Hohenstaufen rule rather than submit to a known tyrant. 

The bulk of this entry is an excerpt from Dr. Schrader's comprehensive study of the crusader states.

The Civil War in the Crusader States is the subject of Schrader's "Rebels of Outremer" Series starting with Rebels against Tyranny. Buy Now!

 
Altogether, Dr. Helena P. Schrader is the author of six books set in the Holy Land in the Era of the Crusades.

                         


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 "The Tale of the English Templar" is a fictional work that depicts the destruction of the Knight's Templar. 



An escaped Templar, an intrepid, old crusader, and a discarded bride
embark on a quest for justice in the face of tyranny. 
 
"St. Louis Knight" is a novel set against the backdrop of the Seventh Crusade and St. Louis' sojourn in the Holy  Land. A Templar novice and King Louis are the central characters. 
It is now available in audiobook as well as paperback and ebook.

 
 A crusader in search of faith --
A lame lady in search of revenge --
And a King who would be saint.

St. Louis' Knight takes you to the Holy Land in the 13th century, and a world filled with knights, nobles, prophets -- and assassins. 
(Available in Audiobook)

Wednesday, October 25, 2023

House of Ibelin: John d'Ibelin, Lord of Beirut, Regent of Jerusalem and Cyprus

 John d'Ibelin, 1179 - 1236, has gone down in history as "the Old Lord of Beirut." The description originates with 13th century historian and jurist Philip de Novare, who  makes "the Old Lord of Beirut" the hero in his account of the baronial revolt against Emperor Fredrick II.  While modern historians warn that Novare was a vassal of the Ibelins and obviously a biased observer, he nevertheless provides a first-hand account of events that are rarely contradicted outright by other sources. Rather, it is the invariable positive "spin" on the motives and actions of the Ibelins that modern historians object to.  Furthermore, none can deny that John d'Ibelin, Lord of Beirut, was a towering figure of the early 13th century, a man admired for his learning, wisdom and influence.



John was the eldest son of Balian d’Ibelin and the Byzantine princess Maria Comnena. He was probably born in 1179, the second of their four children.  He was presumably a child of eight when the Battle of Hattin destroyed the world into which he had been born. He was certainly in Jerusalem when father came to the city to rescue his family―only to remain in the city and organize the defense. John, along with his siblings and his mother, however, was escorted from the apparently doomed city by Saladin’s own body-guard in a profoundly generous gesture on the part of the Sultan before the siege.

The next time John is mentioned in the historical record is in 1198, when he is named Constable of Jerusalem by King Aimery de Lusignan. He would have been only 19 at the time, and historians, balking at the idea of such a young man might have been capable of fulfilling the duties of Constable, hypothesize that the appointment was nominal, a means of providing for him materially. Yet, as his father’s eldest son, he would have already inherited the barony of Caymont, if (as historians assume) his father was already dead. Furthermore, historians appear to overlook the fact that young noblemen and kings came of age at 15 in the Holy Land, so a noblemen of 19 would have been young but not viewed as immature. If kings could command at 15, why shouldn’t a constable at 19? Last but not least, John witnessed all existing charters of King Aimery, suggesting a close relationship between the two men.


John was still quite young, 24, when he was named Regent of Jerusalem first for his half-sister Isabella (following the death of her fourth husband, King Aimery), and then for his niece, Isabella's eldest daughter and heir, Maria de Montferrat, after Isabella’s death a few months later. As regent he arranged a marriage between his niece Alice of Champagne (Isabella’s daughter by her third husband, Henri de Champagne) with the heir to the Cypriot throne, Hugh de Lusignan. In addition, he was influential in the marriage of Maria de Montferrat to John de Brienne. Meanwhile, sometime between 1198 and 1205, he had traded the position of Constable for the lordship of Beirut. It was as Lord of Beirut that he has gone down into history.

Beirut was retaken for Christendom by German crusaders in 1198, but was so badly destroyed in the process (either by the retreating Saracens or the advancing Germans or both) that it was allegedly an uninhabitable ruin.  Despite that, it was an immensely valuable prize because of its harbor, the fertile surrounding coastal territory, and the proximity to Antioch and Damascus.  It was clearly a mark of great favor and trust that John d'Ibelin was granted the lordship of Beirut.


John d’Ibelin resettled the city and rebuilt the fortifications. He also built a palace that won the admiration of visitors for its elegance and luxury. It included polychrome marble walls, frescoes, painted ceilings, fountains, gardens, and large, glazed windows offering splendid views to the sea.  

John first married (presumably in 1198 or 1199) a certain Helvis of Nephin, about whom nothing is known beyond that she delivered to him five sons, all of whom died as infants. Helvis herself died before 1207, when John married the widowed heiress of Arsur, Melisende. By Melisende, John had another five sons and a single daughter, all of whom survived to adulthood.

In 1210, Maria de Montferrat came of age, married John de Brienne, and the couple were crowned Queen and King of Jerusalem; John’s regency was over. Furthermore, he completely disappeared from the witness lists of the kingdom, suggesting he had withdrawn to Beirut rather than remaining in attendance on the new king and queen―whether voluntarily, or after some dispute is unknown.

While nothing is known for sure about John’s whereabouts between 1210 and 1217, by the latter date John and his younger brother Philip headed the list of witness to all existing charters of King Hugh I of Cyprus. This suggests that at some unknown point before 1217 he had acquired important fiefs on Cyprus. In 1227, he was named regent for the orphaned heir to the Cypriot crown, Henry I.


Only a year later, however, the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick II Hohenstaufen arrived at the head of the Fifth crusade, and John immediately found himself on a collision course. At stake was the constitution of the Kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus, with John defending the traditional pre-eminent role of the High Court against the Holy Roman Emperor's attempt to impose absolute monarchy on both kingdoms.  In the long-run, the Hohenstaufen suffered a complete defeat, eventually losing his suzerainty over Cyprus altogether, while neither he nor his heirs were ever able to exercise his royal authority  throughout the Kingdom of Jerusalem. But the cost was high: a civil war that dragged out over a quarter century.

John has been accused by historians of defending only the parochial interests of his family and the leading baronial families. Certainly, his stance undermined central authority in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and ultimately weakened it. Against this argument stands the fact that his rebellion actually strengthened the position of the Kings of Cyprus. Furthermore, Frederick II’s heavy handed attempts to disinherit men without due process and run rough-shod over local laws and customs meant John was fighting as much for the rule of law as for personal interests.   

The fact that John was strongly supported by the commons of Acre further underlines the fact that he was not solely self-interested.  John had no problem accepting the authority of John de Brienne and Henri de Lusignan, after all.  I believe, therefore, a strong case can be made for John opposing not the concept of central authority but rather the individual ― Frederick II, who even his admirers describe as arrogant and authoritarian.  Frederick II believed that, like a Roman Emperor, he was God’s representative on earth. Frederick II provoked revolts in the West as well as the East, and was excommunicated several times.  John d'Ibelin, on the other hand, was widely admired in his own lifetime and has been compared to St. Louis of France by later historians.

He died from injuries obtained fighting against the Saracens on the eastern border of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1236. On his deathbed he joined the Knights Templar.

 

Dr. Helena P. Schrader is also the author of six books set in the Holy Land in the Era of the Crusades. John of Beirut is one of the main characters in  The Last Crusader Kingdom, Rebels against Tyranny and The Emperor Strikes Back.

                         


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For more about the Ibelins and the world they lived in read:

 

Monday, June 7, 2021

The Emperor's Men: The Five Baillies of Cyprus

 Frederick II spent little more than a month on Cyprus, but his short stop triggered a civil war that ended with the Holy Roman Emperor losing this rich and valuable vassal state forever. While this was ultimately the result of the Emperor's disastrous policies, Frederick II also showed poor judgement in his choice of deputies or “baillies." His appointees aggravated the situation and brought the rebellion to a head.




The fundamental mistake that Frederick II made with respect to Cyprus was his refusal to recognize it as an independent and unique kingdom, rather than simply “part of the Empire.” He took no account of the fact that it had its own history and laws, and conveniently overlooked the fact that his ancestors had had no role in the conquest or establishment of the kingdom. Instead, as David Abulafia points out, he “insisted that, as overlord of the king of Cyprus, he had full powers of intervention in the island’s affairs.”[i]

Prof. Peter Edbury suggests that, based on his actions, Frederick’s principle interest in Cyprus was “getting his hands on the profits from the regency for the previous decade.”[ii] Certainly, when he sailed away never to return again in May 1229, his arrangements for the regency of the kingdom were marked by greed; rather than appointing a man (or men) of particular trustworthiness or ability, he sold the regency for 10,000 marks. Indeed, one suspects — although we have no proof of this — that the only reason he chose to appoint five equally powerful baillies (a curious and inherently weak arrangement) was because he could find no one man willing to meet his excessive demands for cash. 

Nevertheless, having found five men willing to pay for the privilege of ruling, Frederick appears to have expected no further problems in milking the rich Cypriot cow.  Because the king was only 12 years old and it would be three years before he reached the age of majority, Frederick assumed he could be ignored. As for the king’s former regent, the troublesome and principled Lord of Beirut, the Emperor believed he had been check-mated by being lured out of Cyprus to take part in the Emperor’s “crusade.” 

This is important. Based on the historical record it is clear that Frederick never intended to fight for Jerusalem. We know now that he was negotiating for the peaceful return of Jerusalem with al-Kamil before he ever set out on his non-crusade. In light of this, it is equally clear that he did not need Beirut’s knights and men to purse his objectives in Syria. We can conclude that the only reason he wanted to ensure they accompanied him on his “crusade” was to make sure they left Cyprus.  Thus, when Frederick sailed away he left behind an island denuded of all of Beirut’s sons, kinsmen, vassals and fighting-men.

With Ibelin out of the way, Frederick turned over control of Cyprus to the five men willing to pay his price and do his bidding. He gave them orders not to allow the Lord of Beirut or any of his partisans to return to the island. The fact that he gave no legal justification for dispossessing another king's vassals is another example of his autocratic behavior, and completely in character with the rest of his actions in the Holy Land.

So who were the five men Frederick II put in joint control of Cyprus?

The names are given as: Sir Amaury Barlais, Sir Amaury of Bethsan, Sir Hugh of Gibelet (also sometimes transcribed as Jubail), Sir William of Rivet, and Sir Gauvain of Cheneché. All were the sons of men who had been active on Cyprus since the establishment of the Lusignan dynasty on the island. Barlais particularly was closely associated with the Lusignans, which may explain why he emerged as the leader or most forceful member of the Emperor’s “quintet.”


Curiously yet significantly, however, the name Barlais is always listed without the preface “of” or “de,” suggesting the family was not of noble extraction.  His father, Renaud Barlais, is known to have come from Poitou to Outremer in the train of one of the three Lusignan brothers (Guy, Aimery or Geoffrey) sometime in the late 12th century. Renaud married the heiress to two fiefs in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. However, it is doubtful that either of these fiefs were still in possession of the lady at the time of the marriage. In light of the fact that Barlais’ field of action was exclusively Cyprus and he does not appear to have been part of the High Court of Jerusalem, I’m inclined to believe his wife’s lands had been lost in 1187 and her titles were nominal.

Amaury de Bethsan came of more exalted heritage, and his father was the uncle of Barlais’ mother, making them cousins.  Bethsan was chamberlain of Cyprus 1218-1220. John La Monte describes the Bethsans as a noble house with an honorable reputation.[iii] Which nevertheless tells us nothing about Sir Amaury himself. 

Gibelet was an even more important family in Outremer.  Gibelet was a major fief of the Count of Tripoli, indeed the fief closest to the border with the Kingdom of Jerusalem and contiguous with the Lordship of Beirut. It had a port and a major castle. Although it fell to Saladin in 1187, it was back in Christian hands by the end of the 12th century.  The Lord of Gibelet at the time of the Sixth Crusade was Guy, who was not a close relative of the Sir Hugh appointed Baillie of Cyprus. The latter came from a cadet branch of the family, albeit not an insignificant branch as his mother has been identified as a sister of King Leo of Armenia. Perhaps the most curious fact about the Gibelet family, however, is that it had a long tradition of good ties with the Ibelins. Indeed, there is good reason to suspect that the author of the pro-Ibelin Chronicle of Ernoul was a Gibelet. Hugh de Gibelet can be said, therefore, to have come from one of the most powerful and respected noble families of Outremer, although he himself may have been a younger son of a cadet branch anxious to improve his personal standing.

The Rivets and Chenechés were also established families in Outremer and Sir Gauvain and Sir William were related to one another as Rivet’s brother was married to the sister of Cheneché’s wife.

As for the men themselves, we know virtually nothing about Sirs William de Rivet, Hugh de Gibelet and Amaury de Bethsan. A hint of their looks or character may be found in Philip de Novare’s satirical fable Le Roman de Renard,  which depicted the opponents of the Ibelins as respectively a fox (Barlais), a badger (Bethsan), and a monkey (Gibelet). Unfortunately, I could not find Novare’s characterization of Cheneché or Rivet.

We do know, however, that Cheneché was accused of attacking a certain knight, Sir William de la Tour (who latter served as an ambassador to the court of the Emperor), treacherously at night. Sir William brought charges against Cheneché before the High Court of Cyprus, then presided over by the baillie Philip d’Ibelin. Cheneché demanded and received the right to defend himself against his accuser in judicial combat. However, Cheneché was bested in the ensuing joust, and had to accept terms which he deemed humiliating. He therefore left Outremer and made his way to the Kingdom of Sicily. According to Novare: “…he knew much concerning birds and so was much honored in [the Emperor’s] court.”[iv] This tidbit is interesting as Frederick II is known to have had a passion for falconry, wrote an entire book about birds, and is often depicted with birds of prey. 

Aimery Barlais, as described in Seeds of Civil War, was also involved in judicial combat that went poorly for him, however, his grievances against the Ibelins were considerably more substantial. He received the mandate to rule Cyprus from the Queen Mother and recognized regent Alice of Champagne sometime between 1224 and 1227 but was denied the right to exercise office by the High Court of Cyprus.  Since the Ibelins were the beneficiaries, he blamed them.

Nevertheless, regardless of their noble backgrounds and legitimate grievances, the recorded actions of the five baillies do not redound to their credit.  First, they happily set about seizing the property of the Ibelins and their supporters without due process. While this was perhaps understandable given their grievances, it was not wise government.  The problem is that subjects tend to get nervous about breaches in the rule of law. No matter what anyone thought of the Ibelins, they recognized that without due process the next victim of unjustified executive action might be anyone — including themselves. Second, the baillies needed to find the money they had promised the Emperor, so they raised everyone’s taxes. Few things are more guaranteed to provoke unpopularity and unrest that levying new taxes. Third, they threatened violence to the women and children of the Ibelins and their supporters. Indeed, they so thoroughly intimidated and frightened them that hundreds of them took refuge in the armed commanderies of the militant orders, particularly the Hospital.

We can also learn something about their character from an incident that Novare describes. Obviously, his account is biased, but it unlikely to have been completely fabricated. Novare claims when he was reluctant to take an oath to the baillies, they ordered his immediate arrest. Fearing for his life, Novare tells us, he appealed to the young king, but the boy king was “much afraid” and did not intervene.[v] Next Novare offered to face any of the baillies in judicial combat, but they refused. He was arrested and placed in a pillory, then released for the night and told to return the next day to face trial. Novare went instead to the commandery of the Knights Hospitaller, where many Ibelin women were already seeking sanctuary. That same night, men broke into his lodgings, killed one of his servants and stabbed his bed many times.  Novare claims to have been warned of this intended murder “by one who cared not whom it might displease” — apparently the young king himself, who had overheard talk of the planned murder.  

It was from the Hospitaller commandery that Novare then penned a lengthy appeal for help — in verse. The long poem is reproduced in full in his memoirs, and is amusing, although it certainly loses much in translation. His appeal appears to have been the final straw inducing the Lord of Beirut to take action in defense of his house and those loyal to it. Within just weeks of Novare’s bungled murder, the Ibelins landed on Cyprus with an army prepared to challenge the Emperor’s men.


[i] Abulafia, David. Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor. Oxford University Press, 1988, p.232.
[ii] Edbury, Peter. John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Boydell Press, 1997, 40.
[iii] La Monte, John. The Wars of Frederick II against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus. Columbia University Press, 1936, p. 19.
[iv] Novare, Philip. The Wars of Frederick II against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus. Columbia University Press, 1936, p. 70.
[v] Novare, p. 94.


The five baillies appointed by Frederick II play an important role in:

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