"I have never seen one!" Borders in the Era of the Crusades

In the era of the crusades, there were no border posts with customs agents. There were no mapping agencies or official maps based on engineering surveys. 

There certainly was no GPS.

Where kingdoms met the sea they ended. Sometimes rivers or other geographical characteristics provided clear and easily recognizable borders. Yet in the vast landmass of Anatolia and Syria such features were rare. 

So how were borders defined and understood in the crusader states? 

And what impact does this have on our understanding of them?

The fundamental fact about medieval borders is that they were less a matter of location than of control. As in Ancient Sparta, political borders were not defined by geography but rather by -- as the Spartans put it -- "the reach of their spears." That is, by the ability of a political power to exert control over a particular territory.

Yet that is only half the equation. Since no state or ruler in the Middle Ages had the capacity to control every cubic yard of territory claimed, the best they could hope for was the submission of the population. Where there were no inhabitants, the land effectively belonged to no man -- no matter who laid claim to it. This was particularly true of the forests of northeast Europe in this period -- and the deserts of the Middle East.

In inhabited areas, in contrast, the political affiliation of any region was defined not so much by geography as by psychology, that is: by whether the inhabitants of a particular region identified themselves as the subjects of one ruler or another. At a simplistic level, a man was the subject of the government to whom he paid his taxes. 

Yet in an era where taxes were largely local, i.e. to a feudal landlord, a guild, a city administration, even that was not necessarily a clear indication of identity with a more centralized state/power. Rural populations, in particular, tended to be focused on the immediate vicinity. Peasant mobility was limited by profession, even in the absence of serfdom, and intermarriage within villages or between neighboring villages was the norm. These patterns created over-lapping networks of loyalties to the family, the locality, and the local lord rather than to distant authorities. After all, under feudalism, a man legally owed fealty to his direct overlord not to the crown. In times of conflict, men usually held to their communities, their families and to their lords, even if that meant coming in conflict with a higher feudal authority or the crown itself.

In the Holy land, both the Franks and the Seljuks were outsiders and the loyalty of some local communities to these alien elites was weak at best. Yet, unlike in most of Western Europe, the population too was ethnically and religiously diverse. Rather than sharing ethnic, linguistic and religious identities with their neighbors, villages in Palestine and Syria were fragmented and diverse. In short, the close bonds that usually tied local communities together did not exist to the same degree; neighbors might identify more with different authorities or might feel closer to someone more distant than the family next-door.

Problematic was the fact that the intermingling of Christian and Muslim populations in some regions was so complete that it was not always possible to draw lines based on religious affiliation. Furthermore, if each side had partisans in each village, both sides felt 'entitled' to claiming them -- and initially did. Soon, however, both parties recognized that in some regions the raids and counter-raids destroyed the wealth -- and food supplies -- of both sides. 

As a result, in the early twelfth century, Franks and Saracens evolved the practice of revenue sharing in certain border regions. This meant, rather than even attempting to draw a border, the parties agreed to first collect the revenues from everyone -- and then divide them based on an agreed formula. The rationale for the ratio determining how much revenue went to each party varied from treaty to treaty and presumably reflected the relative proportion of Christian versus Muslim inhabitants in the specific locales covered by the treaties.

And yet, assuming that the loyalties of the native population inherently followed religious lines, while convenient and comprehensible, is an over-simplification. In the entire history of the crusader states, there is not a single instance of revolt or uprisings on the part of the local population against the Franks -- despite the fact that a large minority was Muslim, and a majority was not Latin. So loyalty and identification with the Franks evolved even among non-Christians.

Traditionally, this is explained by indifference on the part of a native population used to exploitation by a carrousel of invaders from Alexander the Great onwards. Another explanation is the lower levels of taxation and higher standards of justice under the Franks remarked upon by Ibn Jubayr. However, a third explanation might be that the fluid borders followed the psychological divide between the locals inclined to identify with the Franks and those more inclined to identify with the Seljuks. That is, that the Franks were only able to exert lasting control over regions in which the population -- for whatever reason -- was willing to recognize Frankish authority as legitimate. Again, while there may have been a high correlation between accepting Frankish rule and religion, but it would be wrong to assume this was absolute. Jews, Samaritans and some Muslims, particularly Shia Muslims, may also have preferred Frankish to Seljuk rule for their own reasons.  

Nor should the impact of individual personalities be overlooked. In one recorded incident from 1156, the lord of Nablus came in conflict with an imam because the latter's sermons attracted too many peasants, who thereby did not work their fields. The imam responded by emigrating and persuading a number families to follow him. Although there are serious reasons to doubt the veracity of this account (the author claims the lord with whom he clashed as "Baldwin d'Ibelin" -- a man who never held Nablus), it seems plausible that the actions of individuals could cause both immigration and emigration as well as inspire varying levels of loyalty. 

The bottom line is that borders were fluid and more psychological than physical.  

All my novels set in the crusader state attempt to reflect this reality.

 

Myths about the Crusader States 4:

Christian Rulers were Bigoted and Intolerant

  

Most popular literature about the crusader states alleges that the Latin rulers were “less tolerant” of religious diversity than their Muslim predecessors. It is hard to trace the origins of this myth – other than in an excess of political correctness in today’s world.

It is true that in the four centuries of Muslim rule in the Holy Land preceeding the crusades some Muslim rulers were content to live-and-let-live, but -- as my last entry stressed -- there were also periods of extreme repression.  Furthermore, at all times Christians (and other non-Muslims) were taxed extra and treated as second-class citizens, certainly they had no right to positions of power and influence.

This is the standard against which the Christian leaders should be judged.  If used it is quickly clear that the Christians were not more oppressive than their Muslims predecessors.  To be sure Muslims and Jews were subject to special taxes -- as had been the case under Muslim rulers for non-Muslims.  As under the Muslims, all people were allowed to practice their own religion. However, under the Muslims the penalty for trying to preach or convert a Muslim to Christianity was death – as it is to this day in many Muslim countries. (A woman was only recently condemned to death in Sudan, for example, for claiming to be a Christian and marrying a Christian man.) I have never read or heard about a similar law punishing the preaching of Islam with death in the crusader kingdoms.

It is true that the crusaders took the Holy Land by force – as had their Muslim predecessors.  It is also true that while the Muslims allowed Christians to live in Jerusalem, the crusaders prohibited Muslims from living there.  Nevertheless, they did not tear down the Dome of the Rock or destroy the Al Aqsa Mosque, as the Caliph al-Hakim had leveled the Church of the Holy Sepulcher.  The crusaders simply converted these buildings to Christian or secular purposes.

Islam's most sacred shrine in Jerusalem, the Dome of the Rock, was not destroyed;

it was converted into a Church instead.

It is also true that Latin clergy was given control of the most sacred places and put into the positions of greatest ecclesiastical power, such as the patriarchies in Jerusalem and Antioch. Whether the Abbaids, the Fatamids, or the Seljuks were in control, however, they too put their own men into positions of power; Sunnis do not tolerate Shiia religious leaders in their mosques and madrassas and vice versa. Conquerors always take the best spoils for themselves.

The fact that hardly any city resisted Saladin’s conquest of the Kingdom of Jerusalem after the Battle of Hattin is often taken as evidence that he non-Latin population in the kingdom preferred Muslim rule. This is hardly a sustainable argument since the reality was that the kingdom was simply not defensible after the losses sustained at Hattin.  Under the circumstances, the civilian population was eager to avoid the destruction and retribution that the rules of war designated for cities that resisted and were taken by storm.  The civilian population preferred to trust to Saladin’s reputation for clemency.  The situation might have looked very different if the notoriously brutal Zengi had been mopping up – or Baibars or one of the other equally merciless Mamluke sultans had been the opponent in 1187.

Rather, those who assert the “preference” of the subject peoples of the crusader states for Muslim over Latin rule ought to ask why there were no revolts against the Latin leaders? Why was there no “Intifada” against the Christian kings?  How could the tiny Latin Christian elite rule for nearly two hundred years, if their subjects were secret allies of their enemies? Why weren’t Christian towns betrayed to the Muslims each time a Muslim army appeared – and not just after the devastation of Hattin but during Saladin's invasions in 1177, 1179, 1181, 1182, and 1183. 

It is safe to say the loyalty of the various non-Latin elements in the crusader states varied across regions and time.  Initially, the Armenians appear to have been very enthusiastic about crusader rule after decades under the Turks.  Later, they became disillusioned, at least in Eddessa, probably due to misrule and greed on the part of the Latin rulers. In Antioch, the Armenians appear to have been considerably more loyal. Yet in both states, the continued presence of an independent Armenian kingdom undoubtedly undermined loyalty to the Latin elite by keeping alive hopes of reincorporation in a greater Armenian state.

In the County of Tripoli and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Armenians played a much less significant role and the other religious groups were fragmented, so that no one group was in a position to seriously challenge Latin leadership.  Furthermore, a Muslim traveler from Spain lamented the passivity of the Muslims under Christian rule.  In his religious zeal, he may have forgotten or discounted the fact that even the majority of Muslims in the Holy Land were not ethnically Arab or Turkish.  They viewed the Latin rulers as just one more alien invasion in a millennia long history of such invasions.  They had indeed become passive, accepting and accommodating of each change of regime. Furthermore, there was a significant amount of intermarriage between males from Western Europe and females native to the Holy Land.  This tended to reinforce tolerance on the part of both rulers and ruled.

Last but not least, the prominent role played by sergeants in the armies of the Holy Land suggests that the crusader states commanded considerable loyalty among the native, middle-class population.  Some historians speculate that sergeants were drawn from the large population of “half-breed” youth, who – they postulate – did not qualify for knighthood because of native blood. The theory is not convincing, because knighthood could be bestowed on anyone, even full-blooded Arabs, Turks or Kurds. A more logical explanation is that the conditions of fighting in the Holy Land, particularly the fact that the Turks could muster armies with tens of thousands of light horse, made it necessary to have more mounted fighting men than the knightly class could support.  The development of light cavalry on the Christian side was a response to the overwhelming number of cavalry on the Muslim side.

Because horses were expensive, however, these sergeants had to be recruited from among the social classes with comparatively high incomes, albeit not rich enough to afford the armor, arms and training of knights.  The fact that secular leaders of the crusader kingdoms and the militant orders could recruit such men in such numbers (there was an almost two to one ratio of sergeants to knights at most of the Templar and Hospitaller castles) makes it very clear that the “middle classes” in the crusader states -- whether half-breeds or non-Latin Christians –- stood firmly behind the Christian regime. 

That hardly seems reasonable if the Christian rulers were as “intolerant” as many modern books portray them.