W.B Bartlett
in his recent work, Downfall of the
Crusader Kingdom: The Battle of Hattin and the Loss of Jerusalem (The
History Press, 2007), writes in the
Prologue:
During the latter decades of the twelfth century,
Outremer was sleepwalking to disaster. Seemingly oblivious to the dangers of a
resurgent Islam, the kingdom began to split apart. The nobles who governed with
the king sought to outmaneuver one another, seeking to raise themselves up and
bring their political opponents down.
This is by no
means an isolated view, and most modern fiction about the period has followed
the portrayal whether it is Cecilia Holland’s Jerusalem in which, according to the New York Times review, she
brings to life the “atmosphere of conspiracy, betrayal…and political
intrigue….” or Ridley Scott’s “Kingdom of Heaven” in which the fictional
Tiberius condemns the struggles for power and land that he claims corrupted the
ideals of the Holy City.
The character of Tiberius, loosely based on Raymond of Tripoli, in the film "The Kingdom of Heaven."
But let’s be
realistic. There has never been a kingdom or state that has been entirely
without factions — not even in monolithic and totalitarian dictatorships. To expect a state to have perfect harmony and
unity is not merely idealistic, it is naive. Where there is power, there will be
differences of opinion on policy, and where there are competing policy options
there will be factions — usually aggravated by personalities, rivalries and the
prospect of personal gain associated with proximity to power or the execution
of one policy over another.
It is, in
short, absurd to expect the Kingdom of Jerusalem to be without factions
supporting competing policies. Whether
these can be divided into “hawks” and “doves” or “insiders” and “outsiders” is
not the issue here. The fact is that the mere presence of advisors advocating
competing policies and/or even passionate rivalry between powerful noblemen in
a medieval kingdom is neither unusual nor inherently self-destructive.
The question
is whether the divisions within the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the second half of
the twelfth century mortally crippled the kingdom to the point where the threat
posed by Salah-ad-Din was ignored. Let's
look at the historical record.
The Arms of the Kingdom of Jerusalem
Although it is
safe to say that no kingdom on earth would have welcomed the ascension of a man
suffering from leprosy, the High Court of Jerusalem took no longer than usual
to recognize Baldwin IV as his father’s heir.
Furthermore, a powerful regent was rapidly installed who peacefully
surrendered the keys to the kingdom to the leper prince when he turned fifteen.
No sign of exceptionally destructive factions here, despite the explosive
situation of a leper boy being heir to the throne.
Just a little
over a year after Baldwin IV came of age, the Kingdom of Jerusalem faced the
first full-scale invasion led by Salah-ad-Din.
The Count of Tripoli, the Hospitallers and hundreds of other knights from
the Kingdom were at the time laying siege to Hama in Syria; Salah-ad-Din
invaded from Egypt and immediately invested Ascalon. It was a very dangerous
situation. The sixteen-year-old king, with no experience of battle whatsoever,
gathered his forces — some 376 knights — and rode to the relief of Ascalon. He
then broke out of Ascalon, met up with a Templar force from Gaza and called up
the army of Jerusalem. And they came. At Montgisard, under Baldwin IV’s
personal leadership, the Christian army dealt Salah-ad-Din a devastating and
humiliating defeat. The bulk of the Saracen army was killed or captured, and
Salah-ad-Din barely escaped on a pack camel. Nothing about this suggests a
kingdom divided against itself — nor blind to the threat posed by Salah-ad-Din.
A Depiction of Montgisard, Copyright Fireforge Games
The very next
year, Baldwin ordered the construction of a castle at Jacob’s Ford — a clear
indication that he recognized the threat posed by the Kurdish leader. Two years
later, during the next invasion by Salah-ad-Din, Baldwin again successfully
mustered his forces and successfully broke the Saracen vanguard. Unfortunately, the Templars (who were not
under Baldwin’s command) were routed by Salah-ad-Din’s main forces at the same
time. When the Templars fell back, the entire Christian army withdrew. While
the Templars lack of coordination is certainly to be condemned, it has nothing
to do with internal rivalries or factions among the barons of Outremer.
The first hint
of serious internal divisions surfaces in 1180. According to William Archbishop
of Tyre, who was chancellor to Baldwin IV and so not only a contemporary but an
insider, Baldwin IV’s illness had taken a dramatic turn for the worse by this time.
It was clear, therefore, that the crown of Jerusalem would pass through
Baldwin’s older sister Sibylla to whoever her husband might be; Sibylla in 1180
was a twenty-year-old widow.
Sibylla as depicted in Ridley Scott's "The Kingdom of Heaven"
For
whatever reasons (and they are controversial), the Baron of Ramla and Mirabelle
with the backing of the Count of Tripoli and the Prince of Antioch considered
himself the best candidate for Sibylla’s hand, but Sibylla — with or without
her brother’s consent — married a young French noblemen of dubious character,
Guy de Lusignan.
Now Guy de Lusignan was a younger son with no title or wealth,
and, more important, he had allegedly been expelled from the realm and
territories of Baldwin IV’s first cousin, Henry II Plantagenet, for killing the
Earl of Salisbury by stabbing him in the back.
Not a very savory character, to say the least, and I submit it is entirely
understandable that the barons of Jerusalem did not think him a suitable man to
become their liege lord — not to mention be crowned in the Church of the Holy
Sepulchre and wear a crown of gold where Christ had worn a crown of thorns…..
The Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem today.
And yet! The
uproar did not tear the country
apart. To be sure, Ramla refused to do homage to the new Count of Jaffa (the
title given by Baldwin to his sister’s husband) — but he still brought his
troops to muster at each of the subsequent invasions by Salah-ad-Din — as did
the other barons. Admittedly, in 1182 during the full-scale invasion that led
to the battle at La Forbelet, Baldwin IV was still personally in command of the
army, leading from a litter. But a year later, in September 1183, Baldwin IV
had officially abdicated his authority, retaining only the title of King, the
city of Jerusalem and an annual income of 10,000 gold pieces, while naming Guy
de Lusignan regent. Yet the barons of
Jerusalem all mustered — even Tripoli and Antioch and Ramla. It was allegedly
the largest army ever mustered by the crusader kingdoms. Indeed, the force was
so big that Salah-ad-Din preferred not to give battle and withdrew to lay siege
to the castle of Kerak on his way home to Egypt instead.
View from Kerak Castle today.
Nevertheless,
something happened here that has escaped the pages of history. William of Tyre
had been passed over for the post of patriarch and apparently lost his insider knowledge.
He was to die shortly afterwards, and with him we lost our window into what was
happening inside the Kingdom of Jerusalem at this crucial moment. But one thing
is clear, the barons of Jerusalem refused to go to the relief of Kerak under
the leadership of Guy de Lusignan. Baldwin IV — whether reluctantly or
furiously — dismissed him from the regency and had himself dragged in a litter
all the way to Kerak with his army around him. Salah-ad-Din abandoned the siege
rather than face the leper in a liter across a battlefield.
Baldwin IV
returned from Kerak determined to find a way to dissolve his sister’s marriage
to Guy de Lusignan. Why? Regardless of possible personal slights the most
obvious reason is simply that the barons of Outremer, who had rallied readily
enough in September of 1183, were by November of the same year not prepared to
follow Lusignan. Baldwin IV knew he could not leave his kingdom in the hands of a
man who did not command the respect of the barons.
So here is a dangerous rift —
but hardly one in which the kingdom is “sleepwalking to disaster.” Baldwin IV was
obviously acutely aware of the danger. He sent out a desperate, indeed almost
pathetic, plea to the most powerful Christian monarchs, the Holy Roman Emperor,
the King of France, and the King of England, to come to Jerusalem’s aid. He
offered whichever Western monarch would come to the defense of Outremer the
keys to the Tower of David, effectively offering to abdicate — and bypassing
both his sisters — turn the crown over to whoever would pick up the burden of
defending Jerusalem.
The Tower of David in the Citadel of Jerusalem
Baldwin IV’s
appeal went unheeded, and so to prevent Guy de Lusignan from becoming king he
had his nephew, Sibylla’s son by her first husband, crowned in his own lifetime
as Baldwin V. At Baldwin IV’s death, the crown passed seamlessly to Baldwin V
and the Count of Tripoli was named regent by the High Court of Jerusalem.
Again, there is amazing unity here.
Unfortunately,
Baldwin V died within a year. Defying Baldwin IV’s wishes and without the
consent of the High Court of Jerusalem, Sibylla had herself crowned Queen of
Jerusalem and then placed the crown on her husband’s head as her consort. This was a clear “coup d’etat,” a usurpation
of the throne. And here — in the summer of 1186 — the Kingdom started to
crack. Faced with a usurpation, a number
of barons considered crowning a rival king, the husband of Baldwin IV’s younger
sister, Isabella. But the young man, Humphrey de Toron, rejected the role of rival-king
and paid homage to Guy de Lusignan. So,
reluctantly, did all the other barons with two notable exceptions.
The key here
is that despite a clear case of usurpation, the danger of division was fully
recognized. Humphrey de Toron must be credited with putting the well-being of
the kingdom ahead of his personal ambitions, and the bulk of the other barons
likewise swallowed their distaste of Lusignan, and did homage. The two
exceptions were the Baron of Ramla, Guy de Lusignan’s erstwhile rival for the
hand of Sibylla, and the Count of Tripoli. Ramla took the unprecedented course
of turning his entire inheritance over to his younger brother, Balian d’Ibelin,
and leaving the kingdom, never to be heard of again. Tripoli simply withdrew to
his own territories and concluded a separate peace with Salah-ad-Din.
This was an
act that can best be described by the German term “Landesverrat.” In contrast
to “Hochverrat” (treason against the state or government), Landesverrat is
treason against the nation. Tripoli might have legally been correct not
recognize Guy de Lusignan as his overlord, but by allying himself with the man
who had vowed to drive the Christians from the Holy Land, he hurt more than
King Guy, he hurt all the crusaders states and their inhabitants.
The Sea of Galilee, part of Raymond de Tripoli's lands by right of his wife.
King Guy
threatened to invade Tripoli’s territories and “force” his submission, but the
rest of the Christian leadership — from the Grand Masters of the Military
Orders to the Patriarch of Jerusalem — recognized that this was suicidal in the face of Salah-ad-Din’s threat. No
one was stumbling blindly to destruction here except, perhaps the two
embittered protagonists themselves!
Guy was prevailed upon to send mediators instead of troops. The Masters of the
militant orders, the Archbishop of Tyre and two leading barons, including
Balian d’Ibelin, whose brother had been such an inveterate opponent of King
Guy, were sent to Tripoli to effect reconciliation between Tripoli and King
Guy. They were ultimately successful.
When
Salah-ad-Din again invaded the Kingdom of Jerusalem, Raymond de Tripoli was
among the commanders who mustered, bringing with him a large contingent of
troops. His voice in the war councils was a voice of reason, but it went
unheeded. Despite this — and unlike the fictional characters of Tiberias
and Balian d’Ibelin in “The Kingdom of Heaven,” when Guy de Lusignan marched
the Christian army out onto the Horns of Hattin, he lead the entire army of
Jerusalem including Tripoli and Ibelin. To destruction.
In retrospect,
perhaps more division would have served the Christian kingdom better. If Raymond
de Tripoli (with the men of Tripoli and Galilee) and Balian d’Ibelin (with the
troops of Nablus, Ramla, Mirabelle and Ibelin) had not been at Hattin, the
Kingdom — or at least Jerusalem — might have been defensible even after this
devastating defeat. But no one believed that the combined forces of Jerusalem
could be so poorly led that they would be obliterated by the same man the Leper
King had forced to withdraw on no less than five occasions. And had Tripoli and
Ibelin failed to muster, they would have been blamed for the defeat. With the
benefit of hindsight, we know that Guy de Lusignan alone lost Jerusalem.
My biographical novel of Balian d'Ibelin in three parts is set in the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the last quarter of the 12th Century.