Frederick
II spent little more than a month on Cyprus, but his short stop triggered a
chain of events that ended with the Holy Roman Emperor losing this rich and valuable kingdom forever. While this was the result of the Emperor's disastrous policies, he also showed poor judgement in his choice of deputies or “baillies," who aggravated the situation and brought rebellion to a head.
The
fundamental mistake that Frederick II made with respect to Cyprus was his refusal to recognize it as an independent and unique kingdom, rather than simply
“part of the Empire.” He took no account of the fact that it had its own
history and laws, and conveniently overlooked the fact that his ancestors had
had no role in the conquest or establishment of the kingdom. Instead, as David Abulafia
points out, he “insisted that, as overlord of the king of Cyprus, he had full
powers of intervention in the island’s affairs.”[i]
Prof.
Peter Edbury suggests that, based on his actions, Frederick’s principle
interest in Cyprus was “getting his hands on the profits from the regency for
the previous decade.”[ii]
Certainly, when he sailed away never to return again in May 1229, his
arrangements for the regency of the kingdom were marked by greed; rather than
appointing a man (or men) of particular trustworthiness or ability, he sold the
regency for 10,000 marks. Indeed, one suspects — although we have no proof of
this — that the only reason he chose to appoint five equally powerful baillies (a curious and inherently weak
arrangement) was because he could find no one man willing to meet his excessive
demands for cash.
Nevertheless,
having found five men willing to pay for the privilege of ruling, Frederick appears
to have expected no further problems in milking the rich Cypriot cow. Because the king was only 12
years old and it would be three years before he reached the age of majority, Frederick assumed he
could be ignored. As for the king’s former regent, the troublesome and principled Lord
of Beirut, the Emperor believed he had been check-mated by being lured out of Cyprus
to take part in the Emperor’s “crusade.”
This
is important. Based on the historical record it is clear that Frederick never
intended to fight for Jerusalem. We
know now that he was negotiating for the peaceful return of Jerusalem with
al-Kamil before he ever set out on his non-crusade. In light of this, it is
equally clear that he did not need Beirut’s knights and men to purse his
objectives in Syria. We can conclude that the only reason he wanted to ensure
they accompanied him on his “crusade” was to make sure they left Cyprus. Thus, when Frederick sailed away he left
behind an island denuded of all of Beirut’s sons, kinsmen, vassals and fighting-men.
With
Ibelin out of the way, Frederick turned over control of Cyprus to the five men
willing to pay his price and do his bidding. He gave them orders not to allow the Lord of Beirut
or any of his partisans to return to the island. The fact that he gave no legal
justification for dispossessing another king's vassals is another
example of his autocratic behavior, and completely in character with the rest
of his actions in the Holy Land.
So
who were the five men Frederick II put in joint control of Cyprus?
The
names are given as: Sir Amaury Barlais, Sir Amaury of Bethsan, Sir Hugh of Gibelet
(also sometimes transcribed as Jubail), Sir William of Rivet, and Sir Gauvain
of Cheneché. All were the sons of men who had been active on Cyprus since the
establishment of the Lusignan dynasty on the island. Barlais particularly was
closely associated with the Lusignans, which may explain why he emerged as the
leader or most forceful member of the Emperor’s “quintet.”
Curiously
yet significantly, however, the name Barlais is always listed without the
preface “of” or “de,” suggesting the family was not of noble extraction. His father, Renaud Barlais, is known to have
come from Poitou to Outremer in the train of one of the three Lusignan brothers
(Guy, Aimery or Geoffrey) sometime in the late 12th century. Renaud
married the heiress to two fiefs in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. However, it is
doubtful that either of these fiefs were still in possession of the lady at the
time of the marriage. In light of the fact that Barlais’ field of action was
exclusively Cyprus and he does not appear to have been part of the High Court
of Jerusalem, I’m inclined to believe his wife’s lands had been lost in 1187
and her titles were nominal.
Amaury
de Bethsan came of more exalted heritage, and his father was the uncle of
Barlais’ mother, making them cousins.
Bethsan was chamberlain of Cyprus 1218-1220. John La Monte describes the
Bethsans as a noble house with an honorable reputation.[iii]
Which nevertheless tells us nothing about Sir Amaury himself.
Gibelet
was an even more important family in Outremer.
Gibelet was a major fief of the Count of Tripoli, indeed the fief
closest to the border with the Kingdom of Jerusalem and contiguous with the
Lordship of Beirut. It had a port and a major castle. Although it fell to
Saladin in 1187, it was back in Christian hands by the end of the 12th
century. The Lord of Gibelet at the time
of the Sixth Crusade was Guy, who was not a close relative of the Sir Hugh
appointed Baillie of Cyprus. The latter came from a cadet branch of the family,
albeit not an insignificant branch as his mother has been identified as a
sister of King Leo of Armenia. Perhaps the most curious fact about the Gibelet
family, however, is that it had a long tradition of good ties with the Ibelins.
Indeed, there is good reason to suspect that the author of the pro-Ibelin Chronicle
of Ernoul was a Gibelet. Hugh de Gibelet can be said, therefore, to have come
from one of the most powerful and respected noble families of Outremer,
although he himself may have been a younger son of a cadet branch anxious to
improve his personal standing.
The
Rivets and Chenechés were also established families in Outremer and Sir Gauvain
and Sir William were related to one another as Rivet’s brother was married to the
sister of Cheneché’s wife.
As
for the men themselves, we know virtually nothing about Sirs William de Rivet,
Hugh de Gibelet and Amaury de Bethsan. A hint of their looks or character may
be found in Philip de Novare’s satirical fable Le Roman de Renard, which
depicted the opponents of the Ibelins as respectively a fox (Barlais), a badger
(Bethsan), and a monkey (Gibelet). Unfortunately, I could not find Novare’s
characterization of Cheneché or Rivet.
We
do know, however, that Cheneché was accused of attacking a certain knight, Sir
William de la Tour (who latter served as an ambassador to the court of the
Emperor), treacherously at night. Sir William brought charges against Cheneché
before the High Court of Cyprus, then presided over by the baillie Philip d’Ibelin.
Cheneché demanded and received the right to defend himself against his accuser
in judicial combat. However, Cheneché was bested in the ensuing joust, and had
to accept terms which he deemed humiliating. He therefore left Outremer and made
his way to the Kingdom of Sicily. According to Novare: “…he knew much
concerning birds and so was much honored in [the Emperor’s] court.”[iv]
This tidbit is interesting as Frederick II is known to have had a passion for
falconry, wrote an entire book about birds, and is often depicted with birds of prey.
Aimery
Barlais, as described in Seeds
of Civil War, was also involved in judicial combat that went poorly
for him, however, his grievances against the Ibelins were considerably more
substantial. He received the mandate to rule Cyprus from the Queen Mother and
recognized regent Alice of Champagne sometime between 1224 and 1227 but was
denied the right to exercise office by the High Court of
Cyprus. Since the Ibelins were the
beneficiaries, he blamed them.
Nevertheless,
regardless of their noble backgrounds and legitimate grievances, the recorded
actions of the five baillies do not redound to their credit. First, they happily set about seizing the
property of the Ibelins and their supporters without due process. While this
was perhaps understandable given their grievances, it was not wise government. The problem is that subjects tend to get nervous
about breaches in the rule of law. No matter what anyone thought of the
Ibelins, they recognized that without due process the next victim of
unjustified executive action might be anyone — including themselves. Second, the
baillies needed to find the money they had promised the Emperor, so they raised
everyone’s taxes. Few things are more guaranteed to provoke unpopularity and unrest
that levying new taxes. Third, they threatened violence to the women and
children of the Ibelins and their supporters. Indeed, they so thoroughly
intimidated and frightened them that hundreds of them took refuge in the armed
commanderies of the militant orders, particularly the Hospital.
We
can also learn something about their character from an incident that Novare describes.
Obviously, his account is biased, but it unlikely to have been completely
fabricated. Novare claims when he was reluctant to take an oath to the
baillies, they ordered his immediate arrest. Fearing for his life, Novare tells
us, he appealed to the young king, but the boy king was “much afraid” and did not
intervene.[v]
Next Novare offered to face any of the baillies in judicial combat, but they
refused. He was arrested and placed in a pillory, then released for the night
and told to return the next day to face trial. Novare went instead to the commandery
of the Knights Hospitaller, where many Ibelin women were already seeking sanctuary.
That same night, men broke into his lodgings, killed one of his servants and
stabbed his bed many times. Novare
claims to have been warned of this intended murder “by one who cared not whom
it might displease” — apparently the young king himself, who had overheard talk
of the planned murder.
It
was from the Hospitaller commandery that Novare then penned a lengthy appeal
for help — in verse. The long poem is reproduced in full in his memoirs, and is
amusing, although it certainly loses much in translation. His appeal appears to
have been the final straw inducing the Lord of Beirut to take action in defense
of his house and those loyal to it. Within just weeks of Novare’s bungled murder,
the Ibelins landed on Cyprus with an army prepared to challenge the Emperor’s
men.
[i]
Abulafia, David. Frederick II: A Medieval
Emperor. Oxford University Press, 1988, p.232.
[ii] Edbury,
Peter. John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of
Jerusalem. Boydell Press, 1997, 40.
[iii]
La Monte, John. The Wars of Frederick II
against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus. Columbia University Press, 1936,
p. 19.
[iv]
Novare, Philip. The Wars of Frederick II
against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus. Columbia University Press, 1936,
p. 70.
[v] Novare,
p. 94.
The five baillies appointed by Frederick II play an important role in:
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Dr. Helena P. Schrader holds a PhD in History.
She is the Chief Editor of the Real Crusades History Blog.
She is an award-winning novelist and author of numerous books both
fiction and non-fiction. Her three-part biography of Balian d'Ibelin won a
total of 14 literary accolades. Her most recent release is a novel about the
founding of the crusader Kingdom of Cyprus. You can find out more at: http://crusaderkingdoms.com
